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This paper o®ers a novel approach of integrating labor market frictions into a
standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices. The labor market frictions
help explain (i) output and unemployment persistence in response to real and
monetary shocks, (ii) strong ampli¯cation e®ects of real and monetary shocks
on unemployment and the job ¯nding rate, and (iii) the negative correlation
between job creation and job destruction.
At the beginning of each period, unemployed workers choose randomly one
of the ¯rms and apply for a job. Worker-¯rm speci¯c pairs are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, ¯rms face linear hiring and ¯ring costs. These
simple assumptions are su±cient to replicate several important business cycle
facts.
First, our model generates output and unemployment persistence in reaction
to monetary and real shocks and in°ation persistence in response to real shocks.
Labor turnover costs - which in this paper are represented by linear hiring and
¯ring costs - lead to a sluggish adjustment in the labor market, even after
the monetary impulse or the productivity shock have disappeared. Since labor
turnover costs reduce the hiring and ¯ring rates by making hiring and ¯ring
more costly, they reduce the levels of hiring and ¯ring activity in the aftermath
of a monetary shock. Sluggish labor market adjustment also leads to sluggish
product market adjustment after a shock - more sluggish than in the standard
New Keynesian models and in closer agreement with the empirical evidence.
Second, the labor market variables in the model show a strong ampli¯cation
e®ect in response to both monetary and real shocks. In line with empirical
evidence, the standard deviation of the job-¯nding rate and the unemployment
is several times larger than the standard deviation of output. The reason is that
idiosyncratic shocks play an important role for the creation of new jobs in our
model.1
Third, our model is able to replicate a negative correlation between the
job-¯nding rate and unemployment. Further, it generates a strong negative
correlation between job creation and the job destruction.2
It is well known that the standard small-scale New Keynesian framework
with a representative household and neoclassical labor markets does not gen-
erate any monetary persistence when the central bank deviates in uncorrelated
manner from the Taylor rule interest rate behavior. To overcome this prob-
lem, medium scale DSGE models (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005, or Smets and
Wouters, 2003, 2007) contain several assumptions which may be di±cult to rec-
oncile with microeconomic evidence (e.g., habit formation3 or backward-looking
1In contrast, in the standard calibration of search and matching models, the idiosyncratic
productivity shock is set to replicate the appropriate job destruction rate, while it plays only
a minor role for job creation, which is primarily driven by the matching function. See Section
5 for a more detailed intuitive explanation.
2search and matching models with endogenous separations and °exible wages are unable
to do so. See Krause and Lubik, 2007.
3Habit formation may be present for speci¯c goods or services, but not for the entire
consumption bundle, as it is generally assumed in medium scale models.
1indexation4).
Recently, the interaction of imperfect labor markets and labor adjustment
costs with business cycle dynamics has drawn a lot of attention. Campbell
and Fisher, 2000, analyze how hiring and ¯ring costs a®ect job-turnover at the
¯rm and industry level. Veracierto, 2008, shows in a model of employment
lotteries that ¯ring restrictions reduce business cycle °uctuations. In addition,
there are several recent contributions that include search and matching frictions
into the New Keynesian model (e.g., Walsh, 2005, Blanchard and Gal¶ ³, 2010,
Christo®el and Linzert, 2006, Faia, 2008, Krause and Lubik, 2007, Thomas,
2008, Barnichon, 2008).
As noted by Costain and Reiter, 2008, and Shimer, 2005, the standard search
and matching model is not able to replicate the large volatilities of unemploy-
ment found in the data. There have been various attempts to remedy this
problem. Hall, 2005, introduces wage rigidity. Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008,
propose an alternative calibration, using a very high value of unemployment,
which implies that workers do not gain much from ¯nding a job. They note
that this is especially relevant for short-term unemployed people. Thus, their
calibration obviously ¯ts better to the US than to European countries with their
comparably low job-¯nding rates. Cooper et al., 2005, build a very rich model
with ¯xed and variable costs of hirings, adjustments on the intensive margin
and autocorrelated ¯rm-speci¯c shocks. To be able to handle the complexity
of the model, they deviate from the common assumption of wage negotiations
and assume that ¯rms can set the wage in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. We
o®er an alternative avenue of bringing the predictions of the new Keynesian
model into closer consonance with the empirical evidence, namely, by introduc-
ing labor market frictions in the form of hiring and ¯ring costs and providing a
new analysis of labor market °ows. The assumption of perfect labor markets is
widely considered to be a conspicuous weakness of the standard new Keynesian
models and this paper shows how this weakness may be addressed in a simple
and tractable way and how doing so helps explain various well-know stylized
facts.
Our analysis examines the in°uence of hiring and ¯ring costs on the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy.5 These labor market rigidities are empirically
observable6 and the monetary policy transmission mechanism can be given a
straightforward intuition on this basis.
In the absence of labor turnover costs, a worker's current employment prob-
ability is independent of whether she was previously employed or unemployed,
so that her retention rate is equal to her job ¯nding rate. In the presence of hir-
ing and ¯ring costs, by contrast, her retention rate exceeds her job ¯nding rate,
4There is little empirical microeconomic evidence for such indexation. See Woodford, 2007,
for a discussion of this issue.
5Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, analyze convex labor adjustment costs. But they focus
solely on the implications of these costs for °uctuations of the markup over the business-cycle.
Furthermore, their approach does not allow for unemployment.
6For the analysis and quanti¯cation of ¯ring costs, see, for example, Botero et al., 2004,
OECD, 2004, and World Bank, 2008.
2and thus current employment depends on past employment. In this setting, a
current monetary shock a®ects not only current, but also future employment.
Since labor is used to produce output, employment persistence is translated into
output persistence.
Speci¯cally, in the presence of a positive, temporary macroeconomic shock,
workers are hired but, on account of ¯ring costs, these workers are not promptly
dismissed as soon as the shock is over. Thus, the e®ects of the shock on em-
ployment and output persist. But even in the absence of ¯ring costs, hiring
costs create employment and output persistence. For instance, once a tempo-
rary positive shock has passed, some workers are retained who would not have
been hired in the absence of this shock, due to hiring costs. Thus the positive
shock has persistent after-e®ects.7 In this way, the inclusion of labor turnover
costs can be shown to explain how monetary shocks have prolonged e®ects on
output and employment.
We calibrate our model under realistic values of hiring and ¯ring costs for
a typical European economy. Under uncorrelated iid monetary shocks, it takes
several quarters until the economy returns to the steady state, while the stan-
dard model generates no persistence at all. After autocorrelated productivity
shocks, employment, output and in°ation show hump-shaped responses. Thus
labor adjustment costs o®er a new explanation for output persistence, which
has so far been largely unexplored.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the the-
oretical model and Section 3 explains the calibration. Section 4 discusses the
model outcomes, while Section 5 illustrates important business cycle statistics.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model grafts a labor market with labor turnover costs, wage bargaining,
and employed and unemployed workers onto a New Keynesian framework with
Rotemberg adjustment costs. To endogenize hiring and ¯ring decisions, it is
assumed that the pro¯tability of each worker is subject to an iid shock each
period. Firms can change their price in any period but price changes are subject
to quadratic adjustment costs. Monetary policy is represented by a Taylor rule.
2.1 Households
We assume that households have a standard utility function of the form:8
7Alternatively, consider an employee whose productivity is just high enough to be retained.
An unemployed worker with the same productivity will not be o®ered a job, however, due to
the positive hiring cost. In short, hiring costs create persistence in the aftermath of a shock,
because in the presence of hiring costs, the retention probability of employees exceeds the
hiring probability of the unemployed.
8This is similar to the utility function in Krause and Lubik, 2007, except that we do not
need money in the utility function, since we model monetary policy by a Taylor rule rather









where ¯ is the household's discount factor, ¾ the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, c a consumption aggregate (described below)9 and E is the expec-
tation operator.
As is common in the literature, we assume that each household consists of a
large number of individuals, each individual supplies one unit of labor inelasti-
cally and shares all income with the other household members (see, e.g., Merz,
1995 or Andolfatto, 1996). This implies that consumption does not depend on
a worker's employment status. Thus, the representative household maximizes
its utility subject to the budget constraint:
Bot + ctPt = WtNt + BUt + (1 + it¡1)Bot¡1 + ¦a;t ¡ Tt, (2)
where Bo are nominal bond holdings, P is the aggregate price level, T are tax
payments, i is the nominal interest rate and ¦a are nominal aggregate pro¯ts,
which are transferred in lump-sum manner, W is the nominal wage, N is the
total household labor input, B the income of unemployed workers10 and U the
number of unemployed workers. The intertemporal utility maximization yields









2.2 Production and the Labor Market
There are three types of ¯rms. (i) Firms that produce intermediate goods
employ labor, exhibit linear labor adjustment costs (i.e., hiring and ¯ring costs)
and sell their homogenous products on a perfectly competitive market to the
wholesale sector. (ii) Firms in the wholesale sector transform the intermediate
goods into consumption goods and sell them under monopolistic competition to
the retailers. They can change their price at any time but price adjustments are
subject to a quadratic adjustment cost µ a la Rotemberg. (iii) The retailers, in
turn, aggregate the consumption goods and sell them under perfect competition
to the households. The structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 1.
2.2.1 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate good ¯rms hire labor to produce the intermediate good z. Their
production function is:
9In what follows capital letters refer to nominal variables and small letters refer to real
variables (i.e., detrended by the price level).
10B can either be interpreted as home production or as unemployment bene¯ts provided by












































Figure 1: Model structure
zt = atNt; (4)
where a is technology and N the number of employed workers. They sell the
product at a relative price pz;t = Pz;t=Pt, which they take as given in a perfectly
competitive environment, where Pz is the absolute price of the intermediate good
and P is the economy's overall price level.
The labor market approach follows Snower and Merkl, 2006, and Brown,
Merkl and Snower, 2007, who model the labor market in a pure partial equilib-
rium setting, while we extend it to a general equilibrium setting.11
We assume an economy with a large number of ¯rms and a large number of
workers. At the beginning of each period, unemployed workers choose randomly
one of the ¯rms and apply for a job there. For the resulting worker-¯rm pair, an
idiosyncratic operating cost, "t, is drawn, e.g., during the subsequent interview
the mutual ¯t is revealed. The operating costs are measured in terms of the ¯nal
consumption good. If the shock is su±ciently bad, no match will be made, the
worker stays unemployed this period and will contact an other ¯rm next period.
Employed workers are also hit by a shock, drawn from the same distribution.
The ¯rms learn the value of the operating costs of every worker at the begin-
ning of a period and base their employment decisions on it, i.e., an unemployed
worker with a favorable shock will be employed while an employed worker with a
bad shock will be ¯red. Hiring and ¯ring is not costless, ¯rms have to pay linear
hiring costs, h, and linear ¯ring costs, f, both measured in terms of the ¯nal
consumption good. Wages are determined by bargaining between the median
worker and the ¯rm.
11The approach is similar to the way that separations are endogenized in search and match-
ing models, see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999.
5Figure 2: The e®ect of hiring and ¯ring costs
We assume the following sequence of decisions: First, the operating cost
shock takes place. Second, wages are negotiated. And ¯nally, ¯rms make their
hiring and ¯ring decisions, taking the operating costs and the wage as given.
Thus, ¯rms will only hire those workers who face low operating costs (see
Figure 2) and ¯re those workers who face high operating costs. Note that the
retention rate (i.e., 1 minus the ¯ring rate) is always bigger than the ¯ring
rate. The hiring and ¯ring costs drive a wedge between the hiring rate and the
retention rate. Once workers are inside the ¯rm, they are protected by ¯ring
costs (i.e., she will only be ¯red if her present value of pro¯ts is smaller than
minus the ¯ring costs), while the ¯rm has to expense hiring costs to obtain a
worker in the ¯rst place (i.e., she will only be hired if her present value of pro¯ts
is bigger than the hiring costs).
Thus, the real expected pro¯t generated by a worker with operating cost "t
is:12
















where w is the real wage, Át = Áx + (1 ¡ Áx)Án
t is the separation probability,13
¢t;j is the stochastic discount factor from period t to j (i.e., the subjective
discount factor weighted with respective periods' marginal consumption utility)
and Et("t+1j1 ¡ Át+1) the expected value of operating costs for an insider (i.e.,
12We only consider transitory productivity shocks in this paper and ignore productivity
growth. In the working paper version, Lechthaler et al., 2008, we show that trending labor
turnover costs and operating costs is su±cient to assure that unemployment is una®ected by
growth.
13As usual in the literature (see, e.g., Krause and Lubik, 2007), we assume that separations
consist of an exogenous part, Áx, and an endogenous part, Án.
6conditional on retention), given by:









where g("t) is the probability density function of the operating cost. To simplify
the pro¯t function, we rewrite it in recursive manner:
~ ¦I;t = atpz;t ¡ wt ¡ "t + Et(¢t;t+1~ ¦I;t+1), (7)
where Et(~ ¦I;t+1) are expected future pro¯ts, de¯ned as:
Et(~ ¦I;t+1) = Et
µ
(1 ¡ Át+1)(pz;t+1at+1 ¡ wt+1 ¡ Et("t+1j1 ¡ Át+1))
+(1 ¡ Át+1)¢t;t+1~ ¦I;t+2 ¡ Át+1f
¶
. (8)
Unemployed workers are hired whenever their operating cost does not exceed
a certain threshold such that the pro¯tability of this worker is higher than the
hiring cost (see Figure 2 for the graphical illustration), i.e., ~ ¦I;t("t) > h. Thus,
the hiring threshold Àh;t (the value of the operating cost at which the ¯rm is
indi®erent between hiring and not hiring an unemployed worker) is de¯ned by:
~ ¦I;t(Àh;t) = atpz;t ¡ wt ¡ Àh;t + Et(¢t;t+1~ ¦I;t+1) = h. (9)
Unemployed workers whose operating cost is lower than this value get a job,
while those whose operating cost is higher remain unemployed. The resulting
hiring probability is given by:
´t = ¡(Àh;t), (10)
where ¡ is the cumulative density function of ". Similarly, the ¯rm will ¯re
a worker whenever ~ ¦I;t("t) < ¡f, i.e., when the operating costs are so high
that it is more pro¯table for the ¯rm to pay the ¯ring cost. This de¯nes the
¯ring threshold (the value of the operating cost at which the ¯rm is indi®erent
between ¯ring and retaining the worker) as
~ ¦I;t(Àf;t) = atpz;t ¡ wt ¡ Àf;t + Et(¢t;t+1~ ¦I;t+1) = ¡f, (11)
and the rate of endogenous job destruction is given by
Án
t = 1 ¡ ¡(Àf;t). (12)
2.2.2 Employment
The change in employment (Nt ¡ Nt¡1) is the di®erence between the hiring
from the unemployment pool (´Ut¡1) and the ¯ring from the employment pool
(ÁNt¡1), where Ut¡1 and Nt¡1 are the aggregate unemployment and employ-
ment levels: Nt ¡ Nt¡1 = ´Ut¡1 ¡ ÁNt¡1. Letting (nt = Nt=Lt) be the em-
ployment rate, we assume a constant workforce, Lt, and normalize it to one.
Thereby, we obtain the following employment dynamics curve.
7nt = nt¡1(1 ¡ Át ¡ ´t) + ´t. (13)
The unemployment rate is simply ut = 1 ¡ nt.
2.2.3 Wage Bargaining
We assume that wages are bargained between the ¯rm and its median worker.
This assumption ¯ts especially well to the unionized labor markets of continental
Europe, but even in the US many industries are in°uenced by trade unions.14
In analogy to Hall and Milgrom, 2008, and Snower and Merkl, 2006, we assume
that the fall-back position is to continue negotiations next period.15 To highlight
that our results are driven by labor turnover costs, the wage is calibrated in such
a way that it responds strongly to changes in average productivity.
The wage is renegotiated in each period t. Under bargaining agreement,
the worker receives the real wage wt and the ¯rm receives the expected pro¯t
(atpz;t ¡ wt ¡ ¹ "), where ¹ " is the operating cost of the median worker. Under
disagreement, the worker's fallback income is b, assumed for simplicity to be
equal to real unemployment bene¯ts.16 The ¯rm's fallback pro¯t is ¡s, i.e.,
during disagreement there is no production, but the ¯rm su®ers some constant
and exogenously given losses s. This may be a ¯xed cost or a cost that is
imposed due to a strike. Assuming that disagreement in the current period
does not a®ect future surpluses, the surplus of the worker is wt ¡ b, while the
¯rm's surplus is atpz;t ¡ wt ¡ ¹ " + s. Consequently, the Nash-product is:
¤t = (wt ¡ b)
° (atpz;t ¡ wt ¡ ¹ " + s)
1¡° , (14)
where ° represents the bargaining strength of the worker relative to the ¯rm.
Maximizing the Nash-product with respect to the real wage, yields the following
equation:
wt = ° (atpz;t ¡ ¹ " + s) + (1 ¡ °)b. (15)
2.2.4 Wholesale Sector and Retail Sector
Firms in the wholesale sector are distributed on the unit interval and indexed by
i. They produce a di®erentiated good yi;t using the linear production technology
yi;t = zi;t, where zi;t is their demand for intermediate goods. They sell their
goods under monopolistic competition to the retailers who use the di®erentiated
goods to produce the ¯nal consumption good according to the Dixit-Stiglitz-
aggregator:
14E.g., Hall and Milgrom, 2008, motivate their bargaining setup by referring to negotiations
between General Motors and the United Auto Workers.
15See Cheron and Langot, 2004, for another way to break the close link between the labor
market and wage negotiations.
16Note that b is the real unemployment bene¯t, while B, as used in the household's budget










which delivers the standard price index (where Pi;t and yi;t denote the ¯rm-









from the cost minimization problem of the aggregating ¯rm. The implied de-







Firms in the wholesale-sector can change their prices every period, facing
quadratic price adjustment costs a la Rotemberg. They maximize the following
pro¯t function:


















where ª is a parameter measuring the extent of price adjustment costs and
¹ ¼ is the steady state in°ation rate. Taking the derivative with respect to the
price, yields { after some manipulations { the standard price-setting rule under
Rotemberg adjustment costs:
(1 ¡ ") + "pz;t ¡ ª(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼)¼t (20)





To be able to implement the resource constraint, we need to derive the sectors'
pro¯ts. The real pro¯ts of intermediate ¯rms (~ ¦I) are revenues minus wage
payments minus operating costs minus labor turnover costs:
~ ¦I;t = pz;tatnt ¡ wtnt ¡ (1 ¡ Át)nt¡1(1 ¡ ¥i
t) ¡
(1 ¡ nt¡1)´t(1 ¡ ¥e
t) ¡ nt¡1Átf ¡ (1 ¡ nt¡1)´th, (21)
where ¥i
t is the expected value of operating costs for insiders, conditional on
not being ¯red and ¥e
t is the expected value of operating costs for entrants,













The real pro¯ts (~ ¦W) of the monopolistic competitors (i.e., the wholesale
sector) are:
~ ¦W;t = yt ¡ pz;tatnt ¡
ª
2
(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼)
2 yt, (24)
while the retailers make zero-pro¯ts. Hence overall real pro¯ts are given by:
~ ¦a;t = yt ¡ wtnt ¡ nt¡1Átf ¡ (1 ¡ nt¡1)´th ¡ (1 ¡ Át)nt¡1(1 ¡ ¥i
t) ¡




(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼)
2 yt. (25)
Substituting this into the resource constraint (2) (together with Bot = Bot¡1 =
0), we get the relation between consumption and production:
ct = yt ¡ nt¡1Átf ¡ (1 ¡ nt¡1)´th ¡ (1 ¡ Át)nt¡1(1 ¡ ¥i
t) ¡




(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼)
2 yt. (26)
The resource constraint tells us that aggregate consumption is equal to ag-
gregate production minus aggregate labor turnover costs (since real resources
are used for the labor turnover costs), aggregate operating costs and price ad-
justment costs.
2.4 Monetary Policy














where ¼t is the gross in°ation rate (i.e., Pt=Pt¡1), ¹ ¼ is the central bank in°ation
target, yt is the actual output, y is the steady state level of output and ¹ { is the
natural interest rate (for a given output and in°ation level). ¸t is an exogenous
shock to the Taylor rule.
103 Model Calibration
We parameterize our model and use a ¯rst order approximation to generate the
impulse response functions, the second moments and the correlations between
di®erent variables.17 We use a standard quarterly discount rate of one percent,
¯ = 0:99, and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of ¾ = 2. The elasticity
of substitution between di®erent product types, ", is set to 10 (see, e.g., Gal¶ ³,
2008).
Table 1: Parameters of the Numerical Model
Parameter Description Value Source
¯ Subjective discount factor 0.99 Standard value
¾ Intertemp. elasticity of subst. 2 Standard value
" Elasticity of subst. 10 Gali, 2003
ª Price adjustment cost 104.85 Equivalent to µ = 0:75
a Productivity 1 Normalization
° Workers' bargaining power 0.5 Standard value
f Firing cost 0.6 Bentolila and Bertola, 1990
h Hiring cost 0.1 Chen and Funke, 2003
b Unemployment bene¯ts 0.65 OECD, 2007
E(") Expected value of op. costs 0 Normalization
sd Distr. scaling parameter 0.44 To match the °ow rates
s Payments under disagreement 0.2 To match the °ow rates
®¼ Taylor-rule 1.5 Standard value
®y Taylor-rule 0.125 Standard value
As usual in the literature, we set the coe±cients in the Taylor rule as follows:
®¼ = 1:5 and ®y = 0:125.18
The parameter of price adjustments, ª, is calibrated in line with microe-
conometric evidence for Europe (see Alvarez et al., 2006).19 For simplicity, we
normalize the yearly labor productivity to a = 1. The bargaining power of
workers, °, is set to the standard value 0:5.
We take continental Europe as our reference point. We set the ¯ring costs to
60 percent (f = 0:6) of the annual productivity which amounts to approximately
17For the used solution algorithm see, e.g., Juillard, 1996.
18We assume a standard error of 0.01 for the interest rate shock.
19Thus, the log-linearized Phillips curve under Calvo price adjustment under an average
price duration of four quarters (µ = 0:75) and under our chosen calibration for Rotemberg
adjustment costs are equivalent.
1168 percent of the annual wage20 and the hiring costs to 10 percent (h = 0:1)21;22
of annual productivity. In our numerical exercise we will do robustness checks
with respect to the magnitude of labor turnover costs. We set the unemployment
bene¯ts to 65 percent of the level of productivity (b = 0:65). This implies, that
in steady state the wage replacement rate is roughly 74 percent, which is in line
with evidence for continental European countries (see OECD, 2007).
Operating costs are assumed to follow a logistic distribution with zero mean.23
The scaling parameter of the distribution and the payments under disagreement,
s, are chosen in such a way that the resulting labor market °ow rates match
the empirical hiring and ¯ring rates described further below. This yields a scale
parameter of 0:44 and payments under disagreement of 0:2.
We calibrate our °ow rates using evidence for West Germany, as there are
only Kaplan-Meier functions for individual countries.24 But we will show fur-
ther below that these °ow numbers are line with other important continental
European countries. Wilke's, 2005, Kaplan-Meier functions indicate that about
20 percent of the unemployed leave their status after one quarter. For a steady
state unemployment rate of 9 percent, a quarterly separation rate of 2 per-
cent is necessary. This is roughly in line with Wilke's estimated yearly risk of
unemployment. Further, we assume that the steady state share of exogenous
separations is two thirds. This is in line with Krause and Lubik, 2007, and
German evidence (see, e.g., Erlinghagen, 2005).
The used °ow numbers are in line with the OECD, 2004, numbers for other
continental European countries.25 We conclude that a quarterly job-¯nding rate
of ´ = 0:20 and a ¯ring rate of Á = 0:02 are reasonable averages for continental
European countries.
20For the period from 1975 to 1986 Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, calculate ¯ring costs of
92 percent, 75 percent and 108 percent of the respective annual wage in France, Germany
and Italy respectively. The OECD, 2004, reports that many European countries have reduced
their job security legislation somewhat from the late 1980 to 2003 (in terms of the overall
employment protection legislation strictness). Therefore, we consider f = 0:6 to be a realistic
number for continental European countries.
21See Chen and Funke, 2005. Empirical studies on training costs show that training costs
are very substantial. Dol¯n, 2006, shows that the average training time of a worker takes
201 hours (i.e., roughly 25 working days) during the ¯rst quarter of employment. Thus,
our number is probably rather a lower bound. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
corresponding evidence for Europe.
22The choice of hiring costs vary widely in the search and matching literature. While
Andolfatto, 1996, Thomas and Zanetti, 2009 or Gertler and Trigari, 2009 use hiring costs of
approximately 1 percent of output, Shimer, 2005, uses 4 percent, Hall, 2005, uses 8 percent
and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, use 15 percent. Thus, with our choice we lie well in the
middle of the values used in the literature.
23The logistic distribution is very close to the normal distribution, but has an explicit closed
form expressions.
24We choose the Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany, as it is the largest continental Euro-
pean country.
25Although the numbers of the OECD outlook are not directly applicable to our model,
since they are built on a monthly basis, it is possible to adjust them using a method described
in Shimer, 2007.
124 Labor Turnover Costs and Output Persistence
This section demonstrates how labor turnover costs a®ect the response of out-
put to monetary and real shocks. We ¯rst consider an uncorrelated iid shock
to the central bank's Taylor rule. We next consider an autocorrelated shock
to aggregate productivity. Finally, we illustrate in more detail the role of la-
bor turnover costs on output persistence and demonstrate that our model also
generates output persistence for lower values of labor turnover costs.
4.1 One-O® Interest Rate Shock
Let us assume that there is a one-o® expansionary shock to the central bank's
Taylor rule of one percent (i.e., the nominal interest is 1 percent below the in-
terest rate under a purely rule based behavior). In the standard New-Keynesian
model (see Gal¶ ³, 2008) this kind of shock generates no persistent change in out-
put or in°ation. The variables jump during the impact period and immediately
return to their steady state values afterwards (see Figure 3). In the ¯gure it
can also be seen that the reaction is di®erent under the new proposed model
structure with labor turnover costs (LTCs). It turns out that hiring and ¯ring
costs create considerable persistence in the output response (see part 3 of this
Section for further numerical illustrations). The ¯gure also hints at the source
of persistence. The slow adjustment of employment drives the result.
As usual, an expansionary shock lowers the real interest rate (as the nominal
interest rate was adjusted downwards by the central bank and ¯rms cannot
adjust their prices °exibly). Therefore, households increase their demand for
consumption goods (see consumption Euler equation). To satisfy the bigger
demand, ¯rms have to increase their workforce. They can do so via two di®erent
channels, by hiring more workers and ¯ring fewer workers.26 Since this is costly,
the initial response is more dampened than in a model without labor turnover
costs.
Even though the shock has disappeared after the ¯rst period, it shows long-
lasting after-e®ects. Some of the workers who are below the ¯ring threshold
generate no pro¯t for the ¯rm (i.e., they would not be hired if they were not
already within the ¯rm), but it is not worthwhile to ¯re them, as the expected
loss is smaller than the ¯ring costs which would have to be expended. In this
way, labor adjustment costs create a sluggish employment adjustment, which
a®ects other markets in a general equilibrium setting.
Note that, in the context of the simplistic model above, in°ation increases
sharply in the ¯rst period and then undershoots its long-run equilibrium value.27
26It is well known in the literature that the extensive margin plays the dominant role for
business cycle adjustments compared to the intensive margin. Hansen, 1985, shows that 55
percent of the variation in hours worked is due to variations in the number of employed people,
while only 20 percent can be directly attributed to the average hours worked (the rest is due
to the covariance term). Thus, the adjustment mechanism in our model is in line with this
evidence. The underlying reason is that employment changes on the intensive margin are also
associated with costs, namely, the costs of overtime.
27Since intermediate goods producers have the biggest employment adjustment during the
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Figure 3: Reaction to an uncorrelated interest-rate shock in the model with
LTCs and in the standard model
This counterfactual result is no longer present when monetary shocks are su±-
ciently autocorrelated, as shown in the working paper version of this paper (see
Lechthaler et al., 2008).28
4.2 Productivity Shocks
In this section, we describe the e®ects of an autocorrelated shock to aggregate
productivity. We use a coe±cient of autocorrelation of 0:95 and a standard
deviation of 0:01. Figure 4 illustrates the results.
While autocorrelated shocks are necessary to generate output persistence
in the standard model, in our model they are su±cient to generate a hump-
shaped response in output (see Figure 4). This feature is especially attractive,
given that empirical studies typically ¯nd a hump-shape in output (see, e.g.,
Christiano et al., 2005, and Smets and Wouters, 2003).
shock period, marginal costs - and with it in°ation - increase accordingly. Subsequently, ¯ring
increases and hiring falls, as the ¯rm's employment gradually converges to its steady state. A
lower hiring rate increases the quality of entrants, which manifests in lower operating costs.
The higher ¯ring improves the quality of insiders, as only the more productive workers are
retained. Both e®ects reduce marginal cost in the aftermath of the shock and thus in°ation
undershoots.
28For evidence on autocorrelated monetary shocks see, e.g., Rudebusch, 2002, 2006, or Fµ eve
et al., 2007. Other common assumptions, such as backward indexing, would also avoid the
occurrence of undershooting in°ation.
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Figure 4: Reaction to a autocorrelated productivity shock in the model with
LTCs and in the standard model
Again this result is due to labor turnover costs. Hiring and ¯ring costs imply
that adjusting output is costly. Therefore, the impact reaction is dampened. By
contrast, in later periods the level of output is already high and therefore further
increases are relatively cheap. In other words, due to turnover costs the ¯rm
wants to smooth out the adjustment of the workforce.
In contrast, in the standard model without any adjustment costs, the output
jumps up to its highest level in the ¯rst period and then slowly converges back
to its steady state level, one-to-one with the movement in productivity. Note
that, although the ¯rst reaction in output in our model is dampened by labor
turnover costs, the jump in output is still larger than in the standard model.
This is due to the decrease in employment in the standard model, as can be seen
in the lower left panel of Figure 4, which counteracts the increase in output due
to the increase in productivity. In our model, by contrast, employment increases
(rather than decreases) in the immediate aftermath of the shock due to the labor
turnover costs.29
29It should be kept in mind, that in the standard model employment adjusts via the inten-
sive margin, i.e., hours worked, while in our model adjustment takes place via the extensive
margin. The employment reaction to productivity shocks is a hotly debated empirical issue.
Some authors ¯nd a negative employment reaction after positive productivity shocks (see, for
example, Gal¶ ³, 1999), while others ¯nd the opposite (see, for example, Dedola and Neri, 2007).


































Figure 5: The e®ect of di®erent ¯ring costs
4.3 The E®ect of Labor Turnover Costs
The purpose of this section is twofold. On the one hand, we want to show that
both hiring and ¯ring costs tend to increase persistence. On the other hand, we
will demonstrate that our model can generate a lot of persistence even for fairly
low labor turnover costs.
In our model, labor turnover costs have two e®ects. First, they change the
steady states. Lower labor turnover costs lead to higher employment rates and
more production. This corresponds to the observation that the United States
have higher employment rates and lower labor turnover costs than Europe.30
Second, as will be shown below, labor turnover costs increase output persistence
in response to monetary and real shocks.
To illustrate that, Figure 5 compares our standard calibration with an econ-
omy where ¯ring costs are somewhat lower and somewhat higher than in the
baseline calibration (i.e., 50 and 70 percent of the annual wage respectively in-
stead of 60 percent as before), keeping all other deep parameters constant. For
comparability reasons (as there are steady state movements), we express all the
e®ects in terms of percentage deviations from the respective steady state. The
left hand panel shows the impulse response function after a one-period interest-
rate shock, while the right hand panel illustrates an autocorrelated productivity
shock. As before the autoregressive component is set to 0:95.
Figure 5 shows that higher labor turnover costs lead to more output per-
sistence. The larger the ¯ring costs are, the more sluggish is the adjustment
process after both, interest rate and productivity shocks. While the adjustment
during the impact period is more pronounced in an economy with lower labor
30Under the given model structure, the employment rate does not generally increase with
lower ¯ring costs. For the chosen calibration this is however the case, as the hiring rate reacts
more elastically than the ¯ring rate (due to the calibration of the operating costs). This
feature is in line with recent empirical evidence, which shows that hiring is more important
than ¯ring to explain the business cycle dynamics (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005).






























Figure 6: The e®ect of di®erent hiring costs
adjustment costs, the economy also returns more quickly to the steady state
(i.e., shows less persistence). Thus, the adjustment is slowed down by labor
turnover costs. Note, however, that even for lower values of ¯ring costs output
is still considerably more persistent than in the standard model.
Figure 6 repeats the same exercise for varying degrees of hiring costs. Similar
to ¯ring costs, hiring costs tend to lead to more sluggish responses and higher
persistence. Note, however, that the e®ects are relatively small and so our model
still generates a large degree of output persistence even when we lower the hiring
costs to 1%.
Given the fact, that European countries have considerably higher ¯ring costs,
our model would thus predict that persistence is higher in Europe than in the
US. The evidence on the volatility of business cycles across countries is mixed.
Backus et al., 1995, ¯nd that the unconditional volatilities in Europe (for out-
put and employment) are lower than in the United States. This is consonant
with the predictions of our model. However, there is also evidence from Vec-
torautoregressions (VARs) that shows that the reactions to monetary policy
shocks in Europe and in the United States are very similar (see, e.g., Angeloni
et al., 2003).
One way to resolve this possible contradiction to our model would be to con-
sider realistic countervailing e®ects (which, for brevity, we have not included in
the model above). For example, it can be shown that the more competitive are
product markets, the greater is the corresponding degree of output persistence
in response to monetary shocks.31 Since product markets in the US generally are
considered more competitive than those in Europe, on average, this mechanism
would be one way to reconcile our model with the evidence from VARs. Fur-
thermore, micro-econometric studies suggest a higher degree of price stickiness
in Europe than in the United States (see, for example, Bils and Klenow, 2004,
and Alvarez et al., 2006), and this, too, has implications for the comparative
31See, for example, Merkl and Snower, 2009, for more details.
17degree of monetary persistence.
Moreover, it would be premature to believe that the empirical literature has
resolved the question about whether monetary shocks are equally persistent in
Europe and the US. In recent studies in this area, the microeconomic structure
of estimated medium scale models for Europe and the United States (Smets and
Wouters, 2003 and 2007) is speci¯ed in a similar manner. Thus these studies
examine the data with the same priors on the labor market structure. This may
be responsible for the fact that these estimated models generate similar amounts
of monetary persistence for Europe and the United States. It remains for future
research to examine whether the speci¯cation of di®erent labor market struc-
tures in Europe and the United States - re°ecting di®erences in labor market
institutions in these areas - may lead to di®erent results concerning comparative
monetary persistence.
5 Business Cycle Statistics
To be able to make more profound statements on the performance of our model,
we compare the second moments of our model to the properties of time series
data. As hiring and ¯ring costs are particularly relevant in Europe, we have
calibrated our model economy to a typical continental European country. Un-
fortunately, the relevant labor market data for the euro zone is not available.32
Thus, we compare the volatilities generated by the model to data from Ger-
many, the largest European economy. The labor market facts are taken from
Gartner et al., 2009,33 and the aggregate data on output and in°ation from the
OECD, 2009.
We proceed in two steps. First, we compare our model to the standard New
Keynesian model (NKM), using productivity and interest rate shocks. Second,
we compare our model to Krause and Lubik, 2007, who simulate a NKM with
a matching function and endogenous separations. For comparability reasons,
we replace our interest rate rule with money demand and money supply distur-
bances in this exercise, as in Krause and Lubik, 2007.
In line with the analysis above, we consider productivity shocks and interest
rate shocks (i.e., aggregate supply and demand disturbances) when we compare
our model to the standard NKM. Both exercises are done for an interest rate
rule with and without interest rate smoothing34 and compared to the outcome of
32Christo®el et al., 2009, have constructed a labor market data set for the euro zone. Note,
however, that it does not contain important variables such as the job-¯nding rate and the
separation rate.
33For data availability reasons, we have to constrain ourselves to the time period from
1977-2004. See Gartner et al., 2009, for details.
















e¸t, and set the
smoothing parameter, ®s, to 0.8. The autocorrelation of the productivity shock is set to 0.95
and the standard errors of the interest rate and productivity shocks are set to 0.15% and
0.5% respectively. These numbers are broadly in line with de la Croix et al., 2007, and Smets
and Wouters, 2003, 2005. Note that the productivity shock plays the dominant role in the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19the standard NKM. We also consider both shocks simultaneously. As noted, our
model generates substantial in°ation, output, and unemployment persistence
in response to productivity shocks (see last three columns in Table 2). The
autocorrelations for in°ation, output and unemployment under productivity
shocks with interest rate smoothing are very close to what can be found in the
actual data. In a similar vein, our model generates output and unemployment
persistence in response to interest rate shocks (with and without smoothing).
Note, that both our model and the standard NKM do not perform well in
replicating in°ation persistence in response to an interest rate shock. Therefore,
medium scale NKMs (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003, Christiano et al., 2005)
introduce additional adjustment mechanisms to increase in°ation persistence.
Of course, these mechanisms would also increase in°ation persistence in our
model.
Our simple labor market model provides a new mechanism to the NKM,
which generates considerable persistence and richer dynamics (see, for example,
the correlation between output and in°ation, which is not -1 or 1 any more).
Note that in the standard model, output and in°ation persistence in response
to a productivity shock (without interest rate smoothing) basically follow the
persistence of the underlying shock,35 while they are considerably larger in our
model.36 With the two joint shocks, we can roughly replicate the autocorrela-
tions that can be found in the data.
In the data, the standard deviation of the job-¯nding rate and the unemploy-
ment rate are several times larger than the standard deviation of output. Our
model shows a strong ampli¯cation mechanism both for productivity shocks and
interest rate shocks. Table 2 also shows that the ampli¯cation e®ect for interest
rate shocks is stronger than for productivity shocks.37 This result is in line
with Balleer, 2009, who shows in a VAR estimation that the conditional volatil-
ity of job ¯nding and unemployment to technology shocks is smaller than the
unconditional volatility, leaving a large role to non-technology disturbances.38
The standard search and matching model does not have a strong ampli¯ca-
tion mechanism (see Costain and Reiter, 2008, and Shimer, 2005). This problem
has led to a growing literature trying to solve this puzzle: Hall, 2005, introduces
demand shocks, thereby giving more weight to them. See Table 3 for an example where the
demand shock is more important.
35The autocorrelation of in°ation and output is the same as the autocorrelation of the
productivity shock in the standard NKM.
36Den Haan et al., 2000, show that search and matching frictions also increases persistence.
However, their model uses physical capital and °exible prices and is, therefore, not directly
comparable to ours.
37Supply shocks change the production possibility frontier (yt = atnt) and generate short-
run adjustment dynamics, which both a®ect the output path. In contrast, demand shocks
only have the latter e®ect, thereby leading to smaller output variations (for given labor mar-
ket variations). This explains why the standard deviations of the job-¯nding rate and the
unemployment rate divided by the standard deviation of output are larger under demand
shocks.
38Note that Balleer, 2009, did this analysis for the United States. So far, there is no evidence
on this issue for Europe.
20wage rigidity, Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008,39 suggest an alternative calibra-
tion, Cooper et al., 2007, build many additional features into the model, such
as ¯xed and linear costs of vacancy posting, while Den Haan et al., 2000, in-
troduce physical capital.40 In contrast, our model o®ers a completely di®erent
approach, using a standard calibration, °exible wages41 and a very simple and
tractable structure.
The intuition for the ampli¯cation e®ect works as follows: Since the agents
in our model face heterogeneous match-speci¯c shocks, supply or demand shocks
a®ect the range of match-speci¯c shocks over which ¯rms are willing to make
job o®ers. Since aggregate productivity shocks are autocorrelated and demand
shocks lead to strong and persistent changes in the price for intermediate goods
(pz), they have a substantial leverage e®ect on the expected present value of
pro¯ts generated by newly hired workers, and thereby a strong e®ect on the
hiring thresholds (which directly a®ects the job-¯nding rate and thus unem-
ployment).
This e®ect is not at play in the standard search and matching model, as
the creation of new jobs is primarily driven by the matching function and not
the match-speci¯c heterogeneities. This is certainly true with exogenous separa-
tions, where heterogeneities plays no role at all. But it is also true for search and
matching models with endogenous separations, as they are typically calibrated.
In these models, match-speci¯c heterogeneities are used to calibrate the appro-
priate job-destruction rate, which is equal to the probability that a new contact
through the matching function is destroyed. In our model, all the dynamics are
driven by match-speci¯c heterogeneities. Linear hiring and ¯ring costs drive
a wedge between the probability of ¯nding a job, which is reduced by linear
hiring costs, and the probability that an existing job continues to exist, which
is raised by linear ¯ring costs. This generates markedly di®erent dynamics than
in a standard search and matching model.
Having shown, that our model can replicate several important stylized facts,
we proceed with a careful comparison of our model with models using the match-
ing function. The paper that is closest to ours is Krause and Lubik, 2007. They
use a New Keynesian model with a matching function and endogenous sepa-
rations (and without capital accumulation42). In Table 3,43 we compare the
properties of the two models. For comparability reasons, we also use money
39For a discussion of the disadvantages of these two approaches, see Hornstein et al., 2005.
40See Fµ eve and Langot, 1996, for a similar model, estimated for France and Ch¶ eron and
Langot, 2000, for a model with sticky prices.
41Under our reference calibration, the standard deviation of wages is about 77% of the
standard deviation of productivity. When we change the calibration to make wages and
productivity move one to one, the ampli¯cation e®ect shows only slight changes.
42For real business cycle models with capital accumulation see, for example, Andolfatto,
1996, Fµ eve and Langot, 1996, and Den Haan et al., 2000.
43Note that the German data refers to the job-¯nding rate (i.e., new matches divided by
unemployment), while Krause and Lubik (2007) and our business cycle statistics refer to the
job creation rate. The job creation rate is de¯ned as new matches divided by employment
in the previous period. The US data and the KL results are taken from Krause and Lubik
(2007).
21Table 3: Business cycle statistics - comparison with Krause and Lubik, 2007
German US LTC KL LTC KL LTC KL
data data PS PS MS MS JS JS
Rel. SD
U 7.34 6.90 5.26 4.36 10.00 8.20 5.55 4.98
JCR 9.35 2.55 4.68 7.87 23.25 17.17 6.67 9.44
JDR 2.65 3.73 2.29 8.00 8.72 22.94 2.89 11.02
Corr.
JCR, JDR -0.53 -0.36 -0.36 0.28 -0.88 0.18 -0.60 0.34
Y, in°ation 0.40 0.39 -0.11 -0.11 0.63 0.97 0.01 0.12
Autocorr.
Output 0.92 0.87 0.96 0.98 0.81 0.78 0.96 0.95
In°ation 0.57 0.56 0.25 0.60 0.11 0.60 0.19 0.61
Notes: PS: Productivity shock MS: Shock to money supply, JS: Joint shock.
supply shocks instead of interest rate shocks.44 In contrast to Krause und Lu-
bik, 2007,45 our model is able to replicate a negative sign for the correlation
between the job creation rate and the job destruction rate. In our model, the
job creation and job destruction are both driven by the endogenous cut-o®
points for the idiosyncratic match speci¯c shocks. Thus, when job creation in-
creases, job destruction decreases and vice versa. This result holds for both
demand and supply shocks. Note that the search and matching model with
endogenous separations generates counterfactual signs for the correlation be-
tween job creation and job destruction. The intuition is straightforward. The
endogenous separation rate reacts very sensitively to aggregate shocks (due to
an endogenous movement of the cut-o® points), thereby changing the unem-
ployment rate very quickly. This a®ects the ability of the matching function to
generate new contacts. Assume a positive productivity shock, which will reduce
the unemployment rate. As a consequence, the matching function's ability to
create additional matches is reduced and the job destruction rate and job cre-
ation rate move in the same direction (see Figure 3 in Krause and Lubik, 2007).
Another striking di®erence between the two models is that the separation rate
in Krause and Lubik, 2007, is too volatile, which is not the case in our model.
In a nutshell, our model can replicate many important features of the data,
which other models cannot account for. First, in contrast to the standard New
Keynesian model with frictionless labor markets, it generates output and un-
employment persistence. Second, in contrast to the search and matching model
44We use the same numbers as Krause and Lubik, 2007. The standard deviation of the
productivity shock and the money shock are 0:0049 and 0:00623, respectively. The coe±-
cients of autocorrelation for the productivity shock and the money shock are 0:95 and 0:49,
respectively. To obtain a money demand function, we add money to our utility function
(U(Mt) = log(Mt=Pt)).
45Note that Krause and Lubik, 2007, use a US calibration. However, Merkl and van Roye,
2009, show that Krause and Lubik's model has very similar properties with a European
calibration.
22with exogenous separations, it o®ers a strong ampli¯cation mechanism for the
job-¯nding rate and the unemployment rate in response to supply and demand
shocks. Third, in contrast to the search and matching model with endogenous
separations, it generates realistic correlations between the job creation rate and
the job destruction rate.
6 Conclusion
This paper has o®ered a new labor market mechanism for the ampli¯cation and
propagation of real and monetary shocks. In contrast to the standard small scale
model, our model generates output and unemployment persistence in response
to uncorrelated monetary shocks (deviations from the central bank's systematic
rule). Further, it generates in°ation, output and unemployment persistence in
response to real shocks. Since hiring and ¯ring costs reduce labor market °ows,
they make the labor market's reaction to monetary and macroeconomic shocks
more sluggish. The slow reaction of the labor market is transmitted to the
product market, thereby generating persistence.
The model o®ers a strong ampli¯cation mechanism in response to macroe-
conomic shocks (i.e., the job-¯nding rate and the unemployment are a lot more
volatile than output). And the model generates a strong negative correlation
between the job creation rate and the job destruction rate.
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8 Appendix: Set of Nonlinear Equations
To the convenience of the reader, the main equations of the model shall be
repeated here. We have 16 endogenous variables: a; c, y, i, vh, ´, vf, Á, Án, n,
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